In this article we consider the discounted linear quadratic differential game for descriptor systems that have an index larger than one. We derive both necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of an open-loop Nash (OLN) equilibrium. In a small macro-economic stabilisation game we illustrate that the corresponding optimal response is generically cyclic.
Introduction
Dynamic game theory brings together three features that are key to many situations in economy, ecology and elsewhere: optimising behaviour, presence of multiple agents and enduring consequences of decisions. For that reason this framework is often used to analyse various policy problems in these areas (see e.g. Dockner, Jørgensen, Long and Sorger 2000; Jørgensen and Zaccour 2003; Plasmans, Engwerda, van Aarle, Di Bartolomeo and Michalak 2006) .
In applications one often encounters, however, systems described by a set of ordinary differential equations subject to some algebraic constraints. These systems are known as descriptor systems.
Differential games for descriptor systems were e.g. already studied by Mizukami (1993, 1994) . More recently and Engwerda, Salmah and Widjayanti (2008) studied for index one systems the linear quadratic differential game. In the open-loop information case is studied, whereas in the case that players use linear state feedback controls is dealt with.
In this article we take a first step to solve differential games for descriptor systems which have an index that is higher than one. We consider the problem of two players who like to optimise their performance given by a usual quadratic cost function depending both on the state and control variables in which both variables are discounted. The underlying system is described by a set of differential and algebraic equations and we assume that the system is regular, that is, consistent initial states yield a unique state trajectory. The index of the system is k41. It is well known that in that case the state trajectory includes (k À 1)-th order derivatives of the applied input. For that reason we consider the (k À 1)-th order derivative of the applied input as our control instrument.
We assume that the information structure of the game is of the open-loop type. That is, both players only know the initial state and structure of the system, and the set of admissible inputs, U, are functions of time which are k À 1 times differentiable.
Linear quadratic control problems play an important role in applications. Particularly in economics usually the cost of the players is discounted to stress the short-term cost. Since the derivatives of the input function naturally appear in the state trajectory of descriptor systems it seems natural to include these terms in the cost function of the players too. This motivates the problem setting that will be formulated in the next section in detail. The linear quadratic control problem subject to descriptor systems has been considered in the literature by various authors. The approach taken here, to introduce additional states and to consider the (k À 1)-th derivative of the input function as the control instrument, was considered e.g. in Pandolfi (1981) . More references on the regulator problem for descriptor systems can be found e.g. in Mehrmann (1991) , Kunkel and Mehrmann (1997) , Zhu, Ma and Cheng (2002) and . Like many approaches for solving the linear quadratic control problem for descriptor systems, in this article we solve the corresponding game problem using the Weierstrass canonical form of the pencil E À A (1). Using the corresponding state transformation, it is possible to reduce the problem to a reduced order standard game problem. Using the theory for affine linear quadratic differential games as documented in Engwerda (2005 Engwerda ( , 2008 it is possible then to solve the game for both a finite and infinite planning horizon.
The outline of this article is as follows. The next section formalises the problem statement and summarises some basic properties about descriptor systems. In Section 3 we present the main results for the finite planning horizon, whereas Section 4 contains those about the infinite planning horizon. In Section 5 we illustrate some of the theory by a simple example from macro-economics. The example demonstrates in particular that cyclic behaviour may arise within this framework. Finally Section 6 concludes.
Preliminaries
Consider the differential algebraic equation
and the associated matrix pencil
From e.g. Brenan, Campbell and Petzold (1996) we recall the following results. System (DAE) and (1) are said to be regular if the characteristic polynomial detð " E À " AÞ is not identically zero. If the pencil (1) is not regular, then the system (DAE) is underdetermined in the sense that consistent initial conditions do not uniquely determine solutions (Gantmacher 1959) . If the pencil (1) is regular, then the roots of the characteristic polynomial are the finite eigenvalues of the pencil. If " E is singular, the pencil is said to have infinite eigenvalues which may be identified as the zero eigenvalues of the inverse pencil " E À " A. From Gantmacher (1959) we recall the so-called Weierstrass canonical form.
Theorem 2.1: If (1) is regular, then there exist nonsingular matrices X and Y such that
where J 2 R nÂn is a matrix in Jordan form whose elements are the finite eigenvalues, I r 2 R rÂr is the identity matrix and N 2 R rÂr is a nilpotent matrix also in Jordan form. J and N are unique up to permutation of Jordan blocks.
If (1) is regular the solutions of (DAE) take the form
where with
x 1 ð0Þ ¼ ½I n 0X À1 x 0
under the consistency condition that x 2 (0) ¼ 0 (see e.g. Kalogeropoulos and Arvanitis 1998) . Here k is the degree of nilpotency of N. That is the integer k for which N k ¼ 0 and N kÀ1 6 ¼ 0. The index of the pencil (1) and of the descriptor system (DAE) is the degree k of nilpotency of N. If E is non-singular, we define the index to be zero. From the above formulae it is obvious that the solution x(t) will not contain derivatives of the function f if and only if k 1. In that case the solution x(t) is called impulse free. In general, the solution x(t) involves derivatives of order k À 1 of the forcing function f if (DAE) has index k. To verify whether (DAE) has an index of at most one, see e.g. Kautsky, Nichols and Chu (1989) .
In this article we assume that the dynamics of the game is described by
where " E, " A 2 R ðnþrÞÂðnþrÞ , rankð " EÞ ¼ n, " B i 2 R ðnþrÞÂm i , u i 2 R m i is the input by which player i can manipulate the system and x 0 is assumed to be a consistent initial state (so x 0 ¼ x(0 þ )). That is, x 0 is such that the system " E _ xðtÞ ¼ " AxðtÞ, xð0Þ ¼ x 0 , has a unique solution for t40. Assuming that system (6) has index k41 let u ði Þ j :¼
and
We consider then the next quadratic cost functional J i for player i:
Here all matrices are constant in time, both " M i and " Q iT are symmetric and 40 is the discount factor.
The problem addressed in this article is to find the open-loop Nash (OLN) equilibria for the game (6) and (8) as defined below.
Definition 2.2: Assume (6) is regular and has index k41. Let x 0 be a consistent initial state and u i (0), i ¼ 1, . . . , k À 2 be given. Furthermore, let U denote the set of functions which are k À 1 times differentiable with u (kÀ1) piecewise continuous.
we have from Equations (3)-(5) that for any consistent initial state the system dynamics (6) can be rewritten as:
Next introduce the discounted state and control vector
Then, with m :¼ m 1 þ m 2 ,
we have that
Furthermore, with E 2 :¼ ½0 kmÂn I km , we have that
Next, let Using this, it is obvious then that the game (6) and (8) has a set of OLN equilibrium actions (u 1 (Á), u 2 (Á)) if and only if (v 1 (Á), v 2 (Á)) are OLN equilibrium actions for the game defined by 
is such that (10) and (11) holds and
To avoid the inclusion of controls in the scrap value, we make the standard assumption (see also Mehrmann (1991) ) that
Then, (20) can be rewritten as
3. The finite planning horizon
In this section we consider the game (6) and (8) under the assumption that T is finite. As shown in the previous section the OLN equilibria are found by determining the OLN equilibria of the game defined by (19) and (22). Assuming that R ii 40, i ¼ 1, 2 and matrix G (see the Appendix for the introduced notation, in particular for matrixM (35)) is invertible the solution for the last-mentioned game is well known. From e.g. Engwerda (2005) we recall the next result.
Theorem 3.1: Assume that the two Riccati differential equations
have a symmetric solution K i (Á) on [0, T], i ¼ 1, 2.
(1) Then (19) and (22) has an OLN for every initial state if and only if matrix
is invertible.
(2) Assume that the non-symmetric Riccati differential equation
has a solution P on [0, T]. Then (19) and (22) has a unique OLN for every initial state. Moreover, the equilibrium actions are
whereÈðt, 0Þ is the solution of the transition equation _ Èðt, 0Þ ¼ ðA À BG À1 ðH þB T PðtÞÞÞÈðt, 0Þ;Èð0, 0Þ ¼ I:
Assumptions (23) and (25) imply that for both players the optimal control problem that arises if the action of his opponent is known is solvable. In case item (1) in the above theorem holds, but item (2) does not apply, then the corresponding equilibrium actions can be determined by solving a linear two-point boundary value problem. The reader should then proceed similarly as in e.g. Engwerda and Salmah (2008, Theorem 5) .
Corollary 3.2: Assume that the two Riccati differential equations (23) have a symmetric solution K i (t) on [0, T] and the non-symmetric Riccati differential equation (25) has a solution P(t) on [0, T]. Then (6) and (8) has a unique OLN for every initial consistent state x 0 and u (i) (0), i ¼ 1, . . . , k À 2. Moreover, the equilibrium actions are
Moreover, by (17), the corresponding equilibrium state trajectory equals
The infinite planning horizon
In this section we assume that the cost functional player i ¼ 1, 2, likes to minimise is:
,
where (6). We assume that the matrix pairs ð " E, " A, "
Following the analysis of Section 2 it can be easily shown that the game (6) and (26) 
subject to (19) has an OLN. Furthermore, ð " E, " A, " B i Þ is finite dynamics stabilisable if and only if (A, B i ) is stabilisable. So under this assumption, in principle, each player is capable to stabilise the system (6) on his own. This property is a prerequisite to derive the main results below.
We assume that the players choose control functions belonging to the set of functions of time which are k À 1 times differentiable and which are such that the state of the closed-loop system converges to zero, U s . Notice that the assumption that the players use simultaneously stabilising controls implies that stabilisation of the system is a common objective of both players (see e.g. Engwerda (2005) for a discussion).
In the rest of this article the symmetric algebraic Riccati equations
and the asymmetric algebraic Riccati equation
or, equivalently,
play a crucial role. Let (X) denote the spectrum of a matrix X. The next lemma summarises the relationship between the LRS solution of (29) and the stable graph subspace (or disconjugate subspace, see Ionescu, Oara and Weiss (1997) ) of matrixM introduced in (35). A proof of it can be found in Kremer (2002) and Engwerda (2008) . One way to calculate the (left-right) stabilising solutions of (29) is by determining the invariant subspaces of matrix M. Details on this issue can be found e.g. in Engwerda (2005) .
Lemma 4.2:
(1) The algebraic Riccati equation (29) has an LRS solution P if and only if matrixM has an n-dimensional stable graph subspace andM has 2n eigenvalues (counting algebraic multiplicities) in C þ 0 .
(2) If the algebraic Riccati equation (29) has an LRS solution, then it is unique.
From Engwerda (2008) we recall the following two main results.
Theorem 4.3: Assume that
(1) the set of coupled algebraic Riccati equation (29) has a set of stabilising solutions P i , i ¼ 1, 2 and (2) the two algebraic Riccati equations (28) have a stabilising solution K i (Á), i ¼ 1, 2.
Then the linear quadratic differential game (19) and (27) has an OLN for every initial state. Moreover, with F :¼ ÀG À1 ðH þB T PÞ, one set of equilibrium actions is given by:
whereÈðt, 0Þ is the solution of the transition equation _ Èðt, 0Þ ¼ ðA þ BFÞÈðt, 0Þ;Èð0, 0Þ ¼ I:
The costs by using the actions (30) for the players are x T z ð0Þ "
Notice that in case the algebraic Riccati equation (29) has more than one stabilising solution, there exist more than one OLN equilibrium. Matrix M has then a stable subspace of dimension larger than n. In that case, generically, for every initial state there will exist an infinite number of OLN equilibria.
The next Theorem 4.4 gives conditions under which there exists a unique OLN. Moreover, it shows that in case there is a unique equilibrium the corresponding actions are obtained by those described in Theorem 4.3.
Theorem 4.4: Consider the differential game (19) and (27).
This game has a unique OLN equilibrium for every initial state if and only if (1) the asymmetric algebraic Riccati equation (29) has an LRS solution and (2) the two algebraic Riccati equations (28) have a stabilising solution.
Moreover, in case this game has a unique equilibrium, the unique equilibrium actions are given by (30).
Similarly like we did for the finite-planning horizon case one can reformulate the above results also in terms of the original system. Corollary 4.5 below states such a result if there is a unique equilibrium. In that case the corresponding equilibrium strategies can also be synthesised as a feedback strategy.
Corollary 4.5: Assume that the two Riccati equations (28) have a symmetric stabilising solution K i and the non-symmetric Riccati equation (29) has an LRS solution P.
Then (6) and (8) has a unique OLN for every initial consistent state x 0 and u (i) (0), i ¼ 1, . . . , k À 2. Moreover, the equilibrium actions are
The corresponding costs are as in Theorem 4.3.
Remark 4.6:
Notice that the open-loop strategies are independent of the cost player that i attaches to the actual control instruments used by player j (i.e. they are independent of R ij , i 6 ¼ j. So in this case player i will ignore the effects of the (k À 1)-th order derivative of the control u j , used by player j.
An example
In this section we consider a simple macro-economic stabilisation problem. Assume that a monetary and fiscal authority likes to stabilise some key macroeconomic variables, i.e. the real interest rate, r, inflation, _ p, and the output gap, y, after a shock has occurred. The system is described by the following equations:
mðtÞ À pðtÞ ¼ yðtÞ À iðtÞ:
Here p(t) is the price level, i(t) denotes the nominal interest rate, m(t) is the money supply and f(t) the fiscal policy. The first two instruments, the nominal interest rate and money supply, are determined by the monetary authority of the country, whereas the level of the third instrument, the fiscal policy, is set by the government. Here, Equation (32) models the real interest rate, (33) is a simple growth equation of the output gap and (34) models asset market equilibrium (see e.g. Neck and Dockner 1995) . Assume that an initial shock in the real interest rate, price level and output gap has occurred, all equal to one.
Introducing as the state variable xðtÞ :¼ ½rðtÞ pðtÞ yðtÞ T , u 1 ðtÞ :¼ ½iðtÞ mðtÞ T and u 2 (t): ¼ f(t) the model can be rewritten as (6) It is easily verified that this system is regular if and only if : So this model has index two. Elementary calculations show that our model (32)-(34) can be rewritten into the form (19) with x z ðtÞ :¼ e À 1 2 t ½yðtÞ iðtÞ mðtÞ f ðtÞ T ; w 1 ðtÞ :¼ e À 1 2 t ½ _ iðtÞ _ mðtÞ T ; w 2 ðtÞ :¼ e À 1 2 t _ fðtÞ; J ¼ 0; A 1 ¼ ½À 0; A 2 ¼ ;
Assuming that the cost functional matrices are of the form " M i ¼ ½diagð ij Þ, i ¼ 1, 2, where 17 , 18 and 29 are positive, we get from (21) that with 
In the Appendix we calculated the resulting matrixM. Choosing next ¼ ¼ 1 Neck and Dockner 1995) ; M 1 ¼ diag(2; 2; 1; 2; 2; 1; 3; 3; 2) and M 2 ¼ diag(1; 1; 2; 1; 1; 2; 2; 2; 3) we obtain for the infinite planning horizon problem that there is a unique Nash equilibrium. The LRS solution P ¼: [P 1 ; P 2 ], corresponding with these parameters, of the algebraic Riccati equation (29) is The initial state of the transformed system (9), corresponding with the initial state x(0) ¼ [1; 1; 1], is [x 1 (0) x 2 (0)] ¼ [0.5 0.5 2]. To determine a consistent initial state for system (19) we assume that the control used at time t ¼ 0 is Fx z0 and that (since our problem setting concerns a perturbation problem) the initial control [u 1 (0) u 2 (0)] is chosen such that its norm 3 is as small as possible. Some elementary calculations show that the initial control [u 1 (0) u 2 (0)] (satisfying (12)) which is consistent with x(0) ¼ [1; 1; 1] and whose norm is as small as possible is [0.1639 1.9181 À0.4530]. In Figure 1(a) and (b) we plotted the corresponding equilibrium state and control trajectories, respectively.
It is easily verified that the closed-loop system has complex eigenvalues. That implies that the closedloop response shows oscillations. Figure 1 shows the optimal control policy for fiscal policy and nominal interest rate.
From (36) it is clear that if the weight attached by the government for changing its fiscal policy is not too small the eigenvalues of matrixM are close to 1 2 ð4ÂÞ and those of matrix
Since C is a Hamiltonian matrix its eigenvalues are symmetrically distributed w.r.t. the imaginary axis. Furthermore, it can be shown that C has no eigenvalues on the imaginary axis ((C 1 , C 2 ) is stabilisable, (C 4 , C 1 ) is detectable and C 4 40; see e.g. Engwerda (2005, Proposition 5.15) ). So matrixM has exactly four stable eigenvalues in this case. Consequently, the game has generically a unique equilibrium. Moreover, it can be shown (by a detailed analysis of its characteristic polynomial) that C has a complex eigenvalue if the discount factor is not too large (if this discount factor becomes large the eigenvalues are approximately AE 1 2 ð4Â)). This shows that the cyclic behaviour of the closed-loop system we found with the chosen set of parameters in this example is not a coincidence, but holds in general (for a reasonable choice of parameters).
Concluding remarks
In this article we considered the linear-quadratic differential game for descriptor systems which have an index k, larger than one. Since the state trajectory in that case is a function of up to the (k À 1)-th order derivatives of the applied control, we considered here cost functions which take this dependency into account. By actually penalising the (k À 1)-th derivatives of the input function, in fact this (k À 1)-th order derivative can be viewed as the control instrument and one obtains a regular linear-quadratic differential game. Using the standard results on the regular linear-quadratic differential games we derived then both necessary and sufficient conditions for OLN equilibria in this game.
We considered both a finite and infinite planning horizon. For the infinite horizon the standard literature on linear-quadratic differential games requires that the system should be stabilisable by all players individually. For that reason we considered in the general set-up a cost function where future costs are discounted. For the finite planning horizon this assumption can be dropped.
The above results can be generalised straightforwardly to the N-player case. Furthermore, since Q i are assumed to be indefinite, the obtained results can be directly used to (re)derive properties for the zero-sum game. Notice, moreover, that if the discount factor is 'large enough' the infinite horizon game has generically a unique OLN equilibrium.
We illustrated the theory by a simple macroeconomic stabilisation problem. The example shows that the optimal response by the players gives rise to oscillatory behaviour of the closed-loop system under fairly generally accepted choices for the set of model parameters. A phenomenon one often observes in economics. This raises the question whether this kind of response is typical for this type of control problems. A more detailed analysis of this phenomenon is planned for the future.
Obviously there are still many open problems to be solved. In particular, we did not worry about numerical aspects. The calculation of the equilibrium actions using the approach followed in this article requires the computation of the Weierstrass canonical form of the regular pencil (2). In applications it is well known that for higher order index systems this is a serious issue. Recently in Zhang (2006) and Kalogeropoulos, Mitrouli, Pantelous and Triantafyllou (2009) some algorithms are proposed to calculate this Weierstrass canonical form. Unfortunately, we have no experience yet how good these numerical techniques perform in the context of our problem. This remains a topic for future research. Another perspective that might be worthwhile to pursue from a numerical point of view is to consider index reduction algorithms that have been developed in the literature (see e.g. Mattsson and So¨derlind 1993; Kunkel and Mehrmann 2004 ) to reduce the system to an index one system first and next use the results from to calculate the OLN equilibria. Maybe such an approach would also facilitate to analyse the undiscounted case for an infinite planning horizon. Furthermore, all of these problems can also be analysed under different information structures.
